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PREFACE
Public Finance in Post-conflict
environments: A Policy Paper Series
In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building a
durable peace is building a state with the ability to collect
and manage public resources. To implement peace
accords and to provide public services, the government
must be able to collect revenue, allocate resources, and
manage expenditure in a manner that is regarded by its
citizens as effective and equitable.
The tasks of revenue mobilization, budget allocation,
and expenditure management are bound together by
political imperatives as well as economic logic. To collect
revenues, the state must be seen as legitimate in the eyes
of its citizens. And to secure legitimacy, the state must
allocate resources and manage expenditure effectively
and equitably.
The need to build legitimate and capable states in wartorn societies is now widely recognized. The Principles
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,
adopted by the development ministers of major donor
countries in March 2005, declares that statebuilding is
‘the central objective.’ This represents a striking break
from the prevailing wisdom in the closing decades of
the 20th century, when the state was widely regarded as
the problem. The state has been rediscovered: it is now
invoked as the solution. The policy rhetoric has changed
from downsizing states to building state capacity.
Yet little systematic work has been done on what the
international community can and should do to strengthen
the capacities of post-war states to mobilize, allocate, and
spend public resources.
This policy paper series, jointly published by the Center on
International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University
and the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) at the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, seeks to redress this
gap by presenting innovative policy proposals targeting
critical issues in postwar public finance.
Building state capacities in public finance is crucial to the
success of peacebuilding efforts for three reasons:
• First, governments must be able to ensure sustainable
funding for new democratic institutions, for social
programs that ease tensions and redress grievances,
and for public investments to promote economic
growth and development. In the early post-war years,

countries often receive a large influx of external
assistance that temporarily can meet some of these
needs. But aid typically diminishes over time, so
domestic resources are necessary to sustain these
institutions and programs. A key challenge is to ensure
that aid does not ‘crowd out’ domestic fiscal capacities,
but instead stimulates their growth.
• Second, fiscal capacities are needed to build a
legitimate state. Democratic elections do not, in and
of themselves, ensure state legitimacy. Neither do
‘quick impact projects’ in which international aid
agencies seek to fill urgent needs. Legitimacy comes
in large part from government delivery of services that
people need and want. Elections provide an avenue for
the citizenry to voice demands; responding to those
demands requires the capacity to mobilize, allocate,
and spend public resources effectively.
• Third, in some cases there is a need to curtail extralegal taxation by ‘warlords’ and armed groups so as
to enhance security. In Afghanistan, for example,
control of border customs outposts is not only a fiscal
issue but also a security issue. Similarly, control over
revenues from natural-resource extraction, such as
logging in Cambodia or diamonds in West Africa, is
often crucial for establishing the state’s monopoly not
only in legitimate taxation but also in legitimate force.
At the same time, domestic fiscal capacity is the only
sustainable source of financing for public security after
external peacekeepers have withdrawn.
The papers in this series offer policy proposals designed
to strengthen the fiscal dimension of statebuilding. The
authors draw on extensive personal experience in public
finance matters in war-torn societies, and on lessons
from comparative studies, including Peace and the
Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar Statebuilding
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007), the outcome of the first
stage of the CIC’s statebuilding project. After a concise
recapitulation of the problems to be addressed, the
authors concentrate on proposing solutions that can be
practically implemented.
We hope these policy papers will find a wide audience
amongst those who are grappling with the difficult
challenges of post-war reconstruction, and that the
proposals they put forward will assist in the twin tasks
of building legitimate and effective states and building a
durable peace.
James K. Boyce
Lead economist, Peacebuilding as Statebuilding Program
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REVENUE GENERATION
IN POST-CONFLICT
ENVIRONMENTS:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper advances five proposals for policies
to improve revenue generation in post-conflict
environments. In the aftermath of violent conflict
there often is a gap between demands for the
restoration of basic public goods and services,
including jobs and security, and governmental
capacity to generate revenue to meet these pressing
needs. Improved revenue generation is a key task
for building both a sustainable state and a durable
peace.

CURRENT REVENUE-GENERATION POLICIES
Revenue generation depends primarily on three
elements: tax policy, the revenue administration
system and overall economic activity. Each of these
elements is adversely affected by conflict. The
challenge is exacerbated by weak state capacities for
reform pressures from the international community
to increase revenue so as to reduce dependence on
external assistance and international policies that
actually undermine revenue collection.
Revenue systems in low-income countries are
more dependent on indirect taxation than those in
industrialized countries. Policies to increase revenue
therefore have focused on improving collections
from indirect taxes, notably trade taxes. Efforts have
also been made to introduce direct taxes on wages
and business income to lay the foundation for a
transition to greater reliance on these in later years.
Measures to improve revenue administration
have focused on establishing basic infrastructure,
developing
information-management
systems,
strengthening customs administration, and creating
large-taxpayer units that concentrate on the relatively
small number of taxpayers likely to have the largest
tax bills.

FIVE PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE REVENUE
GENERATION
1. Donors should enter into a multi-year
compact to provide matching funds for
direct budget support.
Linking budget-support aid to the amount of
revenue collected will strengthen the incentive for
the government to collect revenue, provide more
predictable financing, free domestic leadership to
focus on administrative reforms, and facilitate more
effective cash management. A matching trust fund
for this purpose can be part of a broader compact
between the international community and the
government. An open and transparent compact of
this nature would set a good example for the dealings
of the post-conflict government with its citizens
more generally.
2. Explicitly reconsider how the
convention on Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations is interpreted
and clearly delimit the extent of tax
exemptions under the Convention.
The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations was crafted 60 years ago, and
many of its provisions have been extended to the
international community more broadly. These
provisions were designed before the advent of today’s
complex and multi-dimensional peace operations.
There is need for a systematic reinterpretation of the
convention regarding the extent of exemptions for
United Nations missions and, by extension, bilateral
missions, international agencies, and mission affiliates
(international and local contractors) from local taxes,
fees, and user charges.
3. Remove exemptions on personal income
tax for foreign contractors and their
foreign employees when double taxation
agreements or similar provisions are
in place. Where there are no such
agreements, work to introduce them.
A significant area of confusion involves the tax
liabilities of foreign contractors and their foreign
staff when there are double-taxation agreements
or similar provisions. Granting a tax exemption in
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these situations simply reduces the tax paid in the
post-conflict country while increasing the tax paid
in the home country. When foreign contractors and
their foreign employees are following the laws of
both their home jurisdiction and the post-conflict
jurisdiction, then on financial grounds they should be
indifferent to whether they receive a tax exemption
or not. Moreover, the cost of the aid project will be
unchanged, because the net return to the law-abiding
contractor or employee will be unchanged by the
removal of the tax exemptions.

4. Where DONOR countries provide
budget support, remove their
contractors’ tax exemptions and reduce
direct budget support commensurate
with the taxes paid.
Tax exemptions for contractors and their employees
create excessive complexity, undermine the integrity
of the revenue system, hamper the development of
local businesses, and deprive the state of an important
potential source of revenue in a time of few options.
Removing these exemptions and counting taxes paid
by contractors toward budget-support aid would
help to build the revenue administration system
and would have positive demonstration effects. This
would not change the total amount of aid provided,
but simply alter the way it is provided to help build
the state’s revenue-generation capacity.

5. Introduce a tax on land holding in
urban areas.
Land taxation is relatively easy to administer and
relatively hard to evade. Such a tax can be based
on value or simply on size. The focus should be on
urban land for reasons of both scarce administrative
capacity and social equity. The fact that the tenure
of the land is often in dispute in post-conflict
environments can actually facilitate introduction of a
land taxation system, since the power of landowners
in established political systems is less fractured.
People making claims on disputed land would do so
understanding that a successful claim brings with it
a tax liability.

/ ii /

CONCLUSIONS
Post-conflict revenue authorities face a twin
challenge – to generate increased domestic revenue
to meet pressing needs and to build a system for
sustainable revenue mobilization in the future. If
the international community can more effectively
support these tasks, the stability and fiscal
sustainability of post-conflict states will increase.
A useful step in this direction would be to convene
a meeting of interested participants to consider the
taxation treatment of the international community
in the broader development context. This could
be organized under the auspices of the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee, the UN
Peacebuilding Commission, or the IMF. In a calm
environment, the detrimental impacts of tax
exemptions can be considered and informed
choices made to reach a consistent interpretation
of these issues. In the course of these discussions,
other proposals presented in this paper, including
the topics of double-taxation agreements and the
provision of budget support, can also be considered.
A package of policy options could then be put
together that would strengthen the capacity of
revenue authorities to do their job in raising the
resources necessary to meet the urgent spending
needs of post-conflict societies.
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Revenue Generation
in Post-conflict
Environments
Michael Carnahan*

Three key elements determine the effectiveness
of revenue generation in any state: policies that
determine the rates of taxation; the things that are
taxable and the things that are exempt; the revenue
administration system, which is the way in which
the policies are implemented and revenue is actually
collected; and the extent of economic activity,
the things that can be taxed. In a post-conflict
environment each of these elements has been
adversely affected.

security sectors will look to finance themselves
through unofficial means.
This paper examines options for revenue generation
in a post-conflict environment. It begins with a
short summary of the elements and goals of a
revenue system, a brief comparison of revenue
collection across different groups of countries, and
a review of the policies and reforms that have been
implemented in recent post-conflict environments
to enhance revenue collection. Against this setting,
the remainder of the paper outlines three specific
ways in which revenue collection could be
enhanced and a sustainable revenue system could
be built: by providing direct incentives through
budget support for enhanced revenue collection,
by restructuring the taxation treatment of the
international community, and by focusing on land
taxation in the post-conflict setting.

These difficulties are compounded by three
additional factors. First, the capacity of the state to
reform its policies and its institutions is weak, so
progress is likely to be slow and difficult. Second,
What is a revenue system
there is pressure from the international community
and what should it do?
to increase domestic revenue collection to reduce
Governments raise revenues so that they can spend
reliance on external budget support. Finally, while
the money to fund the provision of public goods
this pressure can, and has been used by some
such as law and order, public health, and education.
domestic leaders to push for needed reforms, the
In designing a revenue system the most important
policies adopted by the international community
consideration is ensuring that there is adequate
in their own operations often undermine revenue
revenue to meet these essential needs. A range of
collection and the building
other factors is considered
of a sustainable revenue
The use of domestic revenue to fund desirable. The system
collection system.
essential public goods such as health, should be simple so that
the administrative cost and
education and basic infrastructure
There is an intimate link
the cost of compliance to
is at the heart of the social contract
between an effective system
citizens are low. Simplicity
between the citizen and the state.
of public finance and other
and transparency also
dimensions of statebuilding.
reduce corruption and make tax avoidance more
The use of domestic revenue to fund essential
difficult. The revenue system should also be
public goods such as health, education and basic
economically neutral in that it should not favor one
infrastructure is at the heart of the social contract
activity over another – this is regularly referred to as
between the citizen and the state. In the absence
of broad political support for the administration and
*Michael Carnahan is a visiting fellow at the Crawford School of Economics
acceptance of its legitimacy, there will be so much
and Government, Australian National University. He served as senior adviser
to the Minister of Finance in Afghanistan in 2002–04, and as director of the
willful non-compliance with tax policies that even
Budget Office in the East Timor Transitional Administration in 2000–01. He
draconian enforcement efforts will yield very limited
has also worked in the Departments of Treasury and Finance in the Australian
Government.
revenues. Without a functioning security sector,
the enforcement and compliance activities needed
/ For a longer and more general discussion see, for example, Nicholas Stern,
“Aspects of the General Theory of Taxation,” in N. Stern and D. Newbery eds.
to operate a revenue system will be inadequate.
The Theory of Taxation in Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University
Moreover, in the absence of revenue collection the
Press, 1987).
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having a broad base (i.e. tax all economic activities)
with a low rate. Whenever any economic activity
is exempted from taxes it means that all remaining
activities must be taxed at a higher rate in order to
collect the same amount of revenue.
The government must have the capacity to estimate
the amount of revenue that will be collected under
the existing legislation, enact legislative changes
if this revenue needs to be increased, and then
administer the revenue system to ensure that
the revenue is actually collected. Estimating the
available revenue involves analyzing the collections
data from previous years, estimating changes in
major macroeconomic parameters (such as GDP
and inflation) and then estimating the likely impact
on revenue collections.
There are four key elements in taxation
administration: registering and accounting for
payments from taxpayers; annual assessments
and reconciliation of amounts paid by taxpayers
with overall obligations; taxpayer education and
enforcement, which generally focuses on large
taxpayers; and an active program of audits and
court-based prosecutions. Customs administration
also involves valuation of goods, determining
eligibility for exemption, controls of import quotas,
and physically examining goods.

The context: Revenue collections
in post-conflict countries
The experiences of revenue collection in postconflict and developed countries are very different.
On average, revenue systems in low-income countries
tap a much lower share of economic activity than in
higher-income countries, and post-conflict countries
are often below the low-income country average.
Figure 1 presents the level of revenue in relation to
GDP in the EU, OECD, low-income countries, and
select post-conflict countries.
/ Timor-Leste is an exception because of oil and gas revenues, but other revenue
in the country is less than nine percent of GDP.

Figure 1: Revenue/GDP

Source: Data for OECD and EU are from OECD in Figures, 2005; aggregate
low-income country data are from World Bank World Development Indicators
database; country data are from IMF Article IV consultation reports or
statistical annexes. All refer to most recent year for which data are available.

A second feature is the balance between indirect and
direct taxation. Indirect taxation (that is taxation of
goods and services), including trade taxes, services
taxes and consumption taxes, generally requires
a lower level of administrative capacity than
direct taxation (that is taxation of income), which
includes personal and company income taxation. In
developed economies around 60 percent of revenue
is collected from direct taxation, with less than a
third from indirect taxation (and the remainder
from non-tax revenues). In post-conflict countries
these figures typically are reversed with around half
(and in some cases considerably more) coming from
indirect taxes and less than a third coming from
direct taxes. This also reflects the fact that in many
post-conflict economies the formal sector (on which
income taxes could be levied) is relatively small,
with much of the population engaged in subsistence
agriculture. Figure 2 highlights the comparatively
high reliance of post-conflict countries on trade
taxes, a subset of indirect taxes.
Figure 2: Trade Taxes as % of Government Revenue

Source: IMF Article IV reports for Sierra Leone, Liberia and DRC; other
figures from K. Fukasaku, Fiscal Impact of Trade Liberalization: A Review
of Recent Country Experiences in Africa, OECD Development Centre.

Recent efforts to increase
revenue in post-conflict environments
Efforts to support the mobilization of domestic
revenue have been undertaken in most post-conflict
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environments. This section presents a summary of
the most common approaches taken. The efforts
involve both trying to improve the policy environment
and trying to improve administrative capacity.
Improving revenue policies
The first area of focus has been on improving
revenue collections from indirect taxes, particularly
taxes collected at the borders. Major reforms have
focused on simplification of the number of tariff
rates, number of classifications, and extent of
exemptions. In Afghanistan, for example, 25 tariff
rates that ranged from seven to 150 percent were
replaced with a simplified six-rate structure.
A second way in which revenue collections from
border taxes have been enhanced is through
improved exchange rate policies. In many
post-conflict countries the exchange rate used to
value goods for customs purposes is artificial. In
Afghanistan, where the real exchange rate was
around 40 afghanis to the US dollar, at the border an
artificial rate of 4.5 afghanis to the dollar was used.
By virtue of the resulting undervaluation of imports,
the effective duty collected was around one-tenth of
the nominal tariff. Moreover, border posts engaged
in de facto competition by offering even more
attractive exchange rates. Moving to the market
exchange rate for valuation purposes was a critical
part of the overall customs reform package. Similarly,
in Lebanon and Rwanda a key IMF recommendation
was the alignment of the customs exchange rate
with the market rate.
As a short-term measure, a tax on exports also
has been proposed in some countries such as
Liberia, Timor-Leste, and Tajikistan. In general, this
has been proposed in situations where one or two
commodities constituted the bulk of the exports
and production in these areas was rapidly restored
/ Within the international development community primary responsibility for
supporting post-conflict countries in developing their revenue-raising capabilities lies
with the International Monetary Fund.This section of the paper draws on “Rebuilding
Fiscal Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries” prepared by the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs
Division, December 2004 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/2005/022505.pdf).
/ For a more detailed discussion of the reforms in Afghanistan, see “Fiscal
Management in Afghanistan: Major Achievements and Current Challenges” in
M. Carnahan and N. Manning, Reforming Fiscal and Economic Management
in Afghanistan (World Bank, 2004). In August 2006, the six-rate structure was
expanded to a ten-rate structure.

after the conflict. While there were concerns over
the distortionary impacts of such a tax, including
discouraging investment in export sectors with
associated risks to the balance of payments, such
taxes were seen as necessary in the aftermath of the
conflict – when there were few other options.When
the capacity to introduce a broader income tax,
including on the incomes of exporters, is in place,
the export tax can be removed. In Timor-Leste, for
example, a tax on the export of coffee was put in
place in the immediate post-conflict period to raise
revenue, but it was removed when a general income
tax was implemented.
In many cases, taxes on services consumed
predominantly by expatriates (restaurants, hotels,
and telecoms) have been proposed. For example in
Kosovo and Timor-Leste, a services tax of 10 percent
was imposed on these three items. Vehicle rentals
were also taxed in Timor-Leste. A turnover threshold
ensured that businesses catering for local customers
were exempt. The small number of businesses
servicing the international community provides an
easily identifiable tax base. This is one way in which
the international community has been taxed. This
helps lay a foundation for a broader consumption
tax when the administrative capacity can support
broadening of the base.
On the direct taxation side, in most countries
some form of income taxation was proposed,
even though such taxes are more difficult to
administer. The major reason for introducing them
early is the political difficulties associated with
introducing them at a later stage when people are
not accustomed to paying income tax. Where there
was an existing income-tax regime, in countries such
as Cambodia, Lebanon, and Tajikistan, recommended
reforms included harmonizing and reducing tax
rates to increase compliance and base-broadening
through the removal of exemptions. A common
form of income tax in the early post-conflict period
has been a flat withholding tax on wages (e.g.,
in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo),
which is relatively easy to administer in a formal
workforce dominated by civil servants and
international organizations.
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A range of measures also have been proposed
for taxing business income. These included
presumptive taxes on income for small businesses in
Timor-Leste and Kosovo, based on factors including
the type of product sold, the size of the enterprise,
and a rough estimate of turnover. The revenue yield
from these taxes was not anticipated to be high
initially. However, again there is an imperative to
introduce a tax system to encourage a culture of
compliance from the start – especially in sectors
expected to grow.

Improving revenue administration
Several measures have been undertaken to restore
revenue administration in post-conflict contexts.
The first priority typically is to establish the
basic infrastructure for a functioning revenue
administration, including buildings and equipment.
In new countries or territories such as Timor-Leste,
Kosovo, or Bosnia and Herzegovina, the requirements
included physically sound buildings, telephone lines,
and vehicles. Another key piece of infrastructure was
a basic information management system able
to produce revenue statistics and monitor operations.
The second step was the appointment of essential
senior staff.

on high-yielding areas of administration, the authorities,
again with international support, also have created
large-taxpayer units, concentrating on the relatively
small number of taxpayers who are likely to have the
largest tax bills. Establishing these units has often been
challenging because of the lack of a qualified pool of
tax officials to effectively audit large taxpayers.
These efforts to improve revenue collection
performance in post-conflict environments have
achieved considerable incremental progress in many
of the countries mentioned above. However, these
reforms alone have rarely been successful in rapidly
placing post-conflict states on a path to fiscal selfsufficiency—a critical determinant for sovereignty.
One reason is that they have failed to confront some
of the key challenges created by the international
system, discussed below.

Three new options to enhance
revenue generation

The remainder of this paper advances three specific
options to enhance revenue generation in post-conflict
countries. The first option would alter the way that
existing budget support is provided so as to create a
direct incentive for domestic policy-makers to improve
revenue
policies
and
However, these reforms alone have
Operationally, the first step
administration. The second
rarely been successful in rapidly
involves registration and
option is to revisit policies
identification of taxpayers.
around the taxation of the
placing post-conflict states on a path
In many cases (e.g., Liberia,
international
community
to fiscal self-sufficiency—a critical
Serbia
and
Montenegro,
in
post-conflict
countries,
determinant for sovereignty.
Kosovo, Rwanda, Timorwith a focus on building
Leste) this involved registering each taxpayer with a
the capacity of the revenue administration system,
unique taxpayer identification number. This number
not simply to raise revenues. The final option is to
was the basis for filing returns and cross-checking
increase land taxation, on the grounds that during postdata. Administration was also improved by simplifying
war economic recovery taxing stocks of assets may be
the procedures through which tax returns were filed,
preferable to trying to tax limited flows of economic
or instituting simple procedures in the case of new
activity.
administrations.
An initial focus of domestic authorities in many
post-conflict countries (e.g., Kosovo, Timor-Leste,
Afghanistan), with international support, has been
strengthening the customs administration,
reflecting the need to increase actual revenue
collections as rapidly as possible. Maintaining the focus

1. Change the way budget support
is provided by donors
The first option for enhancing domestic revenue
generation is to introduce a modality where budget
support is provided to post-conflict countries
through a matching funds formula.
/ This discussion only focuses on the external assistance that is pledged to
recipient countries in the form of budget support, generally through multilateral
trust funds. In general, a far greater portion of funds are routed around the
government through a parallel external public sector.
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This approach sharpens the government’s incentive
to raise domestic revenue and to manage expenditure
responsibly. From a broader state-building
perspective it also introduces more predictable
financing, frees up the time of the domestic
leadership to focus on reforms, and allows for far
more effective cash management.These support the
more effective operation of the state, and through
this the provision of a stronger enabling environment
for the private sector. The associated growth then
provides a stronger revenue base going forward.

There are several negative consequences of this
modality of supporting the operation of the postconflict government. First, the incentive for the
government to actually raise revenue is diminished.
Taxing people is an unpopular task for any
government. In a post-conflict environment with an
inexperienced cabinet, the notion of raising tax rates
or introducing new taxes to raise revenue is a very
hard sell. Donors are seen as a much softer touch, and
so difficult decisions to raise revenue are not taken.

The second problem with the provision of budget
Immediately after conflict, countries find themselves
support in this way is that the opportunity is lost
with a weak revenue system and a weak economy
to build the capacity of the new government to
and are rarely able to fund the basic operations of
handle the difficult macro-level expenditure-revenue
the state – such as paying salaries. Often domestic
trade-offs, or even the trade-offs among competing
revenues cover less than half of routine operating
expenditure priorities. In most governments, the
expenses. The remainder of the funds are provided
level of expenditure is set largely by the amount
by donor countries in the
of revenue that can be
The trade-off between raising taxes
form of budget support.
raised. In the post-conflict
or reducing expenditure is lost when environment, the trade-off
Budget support is often
opportunistic ministers simply argue between raising taxes or
managed
through
a
multilateral trust fund with
reducing expenditure is
that spending should be increased
an international agency
lost when opportunistic
– so the budget becomes a wish list
as the trustee, such as the
ministers
simply
argue
presented to donors, not a tool that
Afghanistan Reconstruction
that spending should be
prioritizes across competing needs.
Trust Fund (ARTF – World
increased – so the budget
Bank as trustee) or the Law and Order Trust Fund
becomes a wish list presented to donors, not a tool
for Afghanistan (LOTFA – UNDP as trustee), or the
that prioritizes across competing needs. Donors
UNTAET Consolidated Fund for East Timor (CFET –
will not explicitly say no; they just won’t contribute.
UN as trustee). In some cases budget support is also
Thus, unnecessary uncertainty is introduced into the
provided as direct bilateral assistance.What happens
budget process.
in practice is that the domestic authorities prepare a
budget outlining a proposed spending program and
The third problem is the impact of the uncertainty
identify a financing gap. The budget and financing
associated with donor pledges and contributions on
gap are presented at a donor meeting, where donors
the cash-management task during budget execution.
pledge – with varying degrees of commitment – to
In a post-conflict country there is rarely any scope for
meet the financing gap. Over the course of the next
borrowing to meet ongoing operational expenses.
year, the finance minister and their colleagues spend
In this environment, the ability to effectively
a considerable amount of time trying to translate the
manage the cash of the government is critical. The
pledges of donors into actual cash disbursements in
uncertainty surrounding the timing and arrival of
a timely enough fashion to meet the ongoing cash
donor pledges into budget support trust funds means

needs of the government’s operations.
that predictable budget execution is not possible.
/ For example in the case of Timor-Leste for the first two post-conflict years,
domestic revenue covered 37 percent of operating expenditure, while in
Afghanistan the figure was 34 percent.

environments. For discussion, see S. Forman and S. Patrick, eds., Good Intentions:
Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

/ The examples here are built on the author’s experience as the director of the
Budget Office, Central Fiscal Authority, in Timor-Leste and Senior Adviser to the
Afghan Minister of Finance.The situation is similar in many other post-conflict
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Proposal 1: Donors enter into a
multi-year compact with the host
government to provide matching funds
for direct budget support purposes.

certification of the changes, in the balance of the
ministry of finance general revenue account at the
central bank by an independent authority and then,
based on these changes the automatic disbursement
from the trust fund of the agreed amount into the
revenue account.

To address these concerns, donors could agree to
match a percentage of the funds collected by the
host government up to a fixed limit. The matching
The creation of this system would provide an impetus
percentage could be reduced over time, reflecting
for a number of essential improvements in the public
the increasing capacity of
finance architecture in the
The major challenge of such an
the host government to raise
post-conflict environment.
approach involves the preparedness
revenue, and the expected
The primary advantage is that
of donors to make their aid flows
increase in economic activity
it places the incentive fairly
predictable and reliable.
and therefore the tax base.
and squarely on domestic
An example is presented in
authorities to make responsible decisions in relation
the table below.
to domestic revenue mobilization. Rather than the
crowding-out effect of traditional budget support, the
Example of matching funds for budget support
matching funds approach has a crowding-in effect,
heightening the incentive for revenue collection. In
Years
Domestic
Matching
Donor
Total
Revenue
%
Contribution
Budget
the early post-conflict years, recipient governments
1
100
200%
200
300
would know that each additional dollar of revenue
that they raise actually provides them with an extra
2
150
150%
225
375
two or three dollars for domestic spending. In this
3
200
100%
200
400
way the domestic demand for revenue-enhancing
4
250
75%
187
437
reforms – the critical ingredient for their success – is
heightened. Moreover, a matching-funds approach
5
300
50%
150
450
sharpens the link between revenue raising and
6
400
25%
100
500
increasing expenditure, provides much greater
7
500
20%
100
600
certainty to facilitate building stronger cash-flow
skills in the treasury, and reduces the drain on the
time now spent by the finance minister and senior
In the first couple of post-conflict years, donors
officials in chasing donors to turn pledges into
commit to significantly higher levels of budget
disbursements.
support as a percentage of domestic revenue,
reflecting both the lower domestic capacity to
The major challenge of such an approach involves
raise and spend, and the importance of providing
the preparedness of donors to make their aid flows
strong incentives for domestic policymakers to
predictable and reliable – putting into practice
take responsible taxation decisions. Operationally,
agreements on good donor practices made in such
the likely levels of domestic revenues, and the sorts
statements as the 2005 Paris Declaration or the
of levels that would constitute appropriate stretch
DAC Principles for Good International Engagement
targets, could be agreed upon by IMF officials and
in
Fragile States. The provision of funds in this way
donors.
In practice, the system would involve the creation
of a trust fund into which donors would make
contributions. The details of the agreement
establishing the trust would specify its operations,
but the simplest operation would involve monthly
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/ The Paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005, is an international agreement
in which over 100 ministers, heads of agencies and other senior officials
committed their countries and organizations to continue and increase their
efforts on harmonization, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of
monitorable actions and indicators.
See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf.
/ These principles were prepared following discussions at the January 2005
OECD Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States to
build on the growing consensus about aid effectiveness.
See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf.
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requires a greater degree of planning and discipline
in donor operations than has been demonstrated in
post-conflict environments to date.While a matching
funds approach removes the opportunity to use
individual budget contributions as a direct incentive
to micro-manage the post-conflict government, a
matching trust fund can be part of a broader compact
between the international community and the
post-conflict government. An open and transparent
compact of this nature sets a good example for the
dealings of the post-conflict government with its
citizens more generally.

consequences of administering these exemptions in
the post-conflict setting are then examined. Foregone
revenue is one concern, but a bigger concern is
the damage that is done to the fragile revenue
administration and the lost opportunity to build a
more robust system. The third part addresses some
of the most common objections raised by those
opposed to paying taxes. The final part presents
some concrete ways to support revenue generation
from the international community.

2. Taxation of the international
community

In dealing with revenue authorities in host
countries, the international community regularly
situates its arguments within the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.11
The convention provides a clear set of immunities
to the United Nations and its staff. The United
Nations is exempt from all direct taxes (such as
income taxes), but will not claim exemptions from
charges for use of public utilities (Section 7a). It is
exempt from customs duties (Section 7b), but will
not as a rule claim exemption from excise duties
(Section 8). International UN staff shall be exempt
from taxation on their salaries (Section 18b) and
have the right to import their furniture and effects
free of duty when first taking up their posting, but
they are not exempt from customs or excise duties
on other goods imported for personal consumption.
The convention makes no reference to the taxation
treatment of national staff or contractors to the
United Nations, nor does it refer to the UN’s system
of “staff assessment.”12

In any post-conflict setting, the operations of the
international community, including the emergency
and
humanitarian
activities, reconstruction
activities, and the general level of economic
activity associated with an increased international
presence, represent a large share of the economic
activity. Where subsistence agriculture represents
another large share of the economy, the activities
of the international community represent an even
larger share of the formal economy. In its report
on “Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-Conflict
Countries,” the IMF notes:
Most post-conflict countries experienced a large influx of
expatriates in connection with relief and reconstruction work.
In general these incomes were exempt from taxation. The
differential treatment of expatriates risked creating a culture of
tax exemptions and made it more difficult to implement a simple
tax system where all taxpayers faced a level playing field.10

Taxing the activities of the international community
is a very emotive issue, with passionate views held
by many stakeholders. It is also an area where
there is a considerable degree of confusion and
misunderstanding. The discussion that follows is
intended to address some of these misunderstandings
and clear up some of the confusion. The first part
provides some background on the privileges and
immunities enjoyed by the United Nations – which
are generally used by other international players
as a benchmark for their own concessions. The
10/ IMF FAD op cit, para 44.

Background

When the UN mission is operating in a country with a
sovereign government, a further set of privileges and
11/ The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations was
adopted by the General Assembly on 13 February 1946. Most, if not all, bilateral
agencies include a clause in their country agreements that guarantees them
privileges and immunities that are “no less than” those enjoyed by the United
Nations. Hence the focus here is on the convention.
12/ Staff assessment is sometimes characterized as a form of internal “tax”
administered by the United Nations. UN staff salaries are expressed in gross
and net amounts.The difference (the assessment) is not paid like a regular tax.
Rather it is deposited into the UN’s Tax Equalization Fund, the purpose of which
is to ensure horizontal equity for those employees who are liable to pay income
tax because they are citizens of the handful of countries that have not signed
the convention.The fund is used to offset tax payments by these employees
and to offset financial obligations to support United Nations operations for
those countries that are signatories to the convention. In effect, signatories pay
lower UN dues while non-signatories pay higher dues and their citizens are
compensated for being subject to income taxation.
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immunities are contained in the agreement between
Consequences
the host government and the UN that establishes
Tax exemptions have several negative consequences
the mission. A model status of forces agreement
for the host economy. They directly reduce the
(SOFA) presented to the General Assembly in 1990
state’s revenue – because taxes are not paid. Indeed,
(A/45/594) has been the basis for many of these
given that the major economic activity in the early
agreements. This model confirms the convention
years of post-conflict recovery revolves around the
but also extends it to add several other immunities,
international community, exemptions of this nature
including the right to establish a commissary which
remove the major potential source of revenue. Even
can import goods free of duty for resale to members
more problematic, however, is the damage caused to
of the peacekeeping operation and the right to
the integrity of the revenue
purchase goods and services
administration system. In
The host government finds itself in
locally free from sales taxes.It
situations where missions
a very weak position, needing the
also obliges the government
been
deployed,
to provide accommodation peacekeeping mission to establish basic have
to the mission free of charge; security, and so it is prepared to agree administrative capacity is
to provide water, electricity, to whatever conditions are presented. generally very low and the
bureaucracy is often poorly
and other utilities free of
paid and corrupt. In building an administrative
charge or at the most favorable rate; and to grant
system that can work, there is an absolute premium
13
locally recruited staff immunity from taxation.
on both simplicity and removing discretion.
The taxation treatment of contractors or their staff
Concessions of this nature add an administrative
again is not covered. In Afghanistan the model was
burden and an additional layer of complexity to an
extended specifically to grant tax exemptions to UN
already weak system. In doing this, they seriously
contractors, other than local contractors.
undermine the chances of building a revenue system
that can operate on a sustainable basis.
The model SOFA thus establishes greater concessions
than are included in the original convention. CountryThe complexity in the system is exacerbated by
specific agreements are generally negotiated to
the blurred lines in regard to exemptions. There are
maximize the extent of exemptions and concessions.
relatively few who argue that international staff of
A real concern is that the host government finds itself
UN missions, or international staff in donor agencies,
in a very weak position, needing the peacekeeping
should be liable for hostmission to establish basic
Should a contractor to a donor
country tax on the income
security, and so it is prepared
organization be liable for tax? Should the they earn. However, as the
to agree to whatever
foreign employees of the contractor, or funds move further and
conditions are presented.14
the local employees of the contractor, or further into and through the
the local employees of a sub-contractor? economy, there is a question
When there is no host
of when the exemption
government, as in Timorshould be stopped. Should a contractor to a donor
Leste or Kosovo, there is even less
organization be liable for tax? Should the foreign
counterbalancing force to limit the immunities.
employees of the contractor, or the local employees
of the contractor, or the local employees of a sub13/ There are, of course, anomalies in the application of even such routine
requirements. For example, in Sierra Leone, the government had previously leased
contractor? Should staff be exempt from indirect tax
the building most suitable for UN mission headquarters to a private party, who
as well as direct tax?
was not bound by Security Council requirements and whom the mission then
paid to sub-lease the building. In the absence of the government’s initial lease,
the mission would have occupied the building rent-free. Under the prevailing
arrangement, however, the government received both rent and taxes from its
lessee, and the UN’s sub-lease covered both.
14/ See, for example, M. de Brito,The Relationship between Peacekeepers, Host
Governments and the Local Population, Monograph 10, Conflict Management,
Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development (www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs), for comments on the
negotiations between the Mozambican Government and ONUMOZ.
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This complexity is illustrated in the Appendix Table
which lists the different rules that currently apply
to different entities in Kosovo. Tax liabilities vary for
different organizations. They vary for depending on

Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments

which organization they work for and on whether
they are international or local staff. They vary for the
contractors of different organizations, and again for
the employees of different contractors to different
organizations, again depending on the organization
and whether the contractor and the employee
are local or international. A revenue authority in
a developed country would be criticized for this
level of complexity. A revenue authority in a postconflict country that allocates its scarce resources to
managing this complexity will not be able to build a
strong administrative structure.
The integrity of the revenue system is also damaged
by the demonstration effect of the exemptions. In a
weak system, compliance is a particular challenge—
especially when the court system that is needed for
enforcement is also weak. The attitude of trying to
minimize taxation, rather than seeing revenue collection
as a necessary state function, is adopted by others in
the economy. In regard to user-charge collections,
for example, compliance by private businesses is
compromised when the major users (foreign missions)
claim exemptions.
Finally, the tax exemptions to the international
community hamper the development of local
businesses. Merchants selling imported goods on
which duty has been paid cannot compete with goods
sold in the commissary, or with goods that have been
imported duty-free for the international community and
then sold privately—so these policies have the effect
of favoring dishonest businesses over honest ones.
Similarly, exemptions for international contractors give
them a competitive edge over local contractors who
have to pay tax, again hampering the development of
the legitimate domestic private sector.

explained by the fact that many international
organizations see themselves fundamentally as
operating outside of – and in a sense, above – the
state. Many staff in international organizations do not
understand the importance of raising revenue for the
creation of a sustainable state, in some cases because
their own resources come from voluntary fundraising
appeals, not from revenue collection. Moreover, the
centrality of statebuilding to forging a durable peace
and sustained poverty reduction remains contested
by some.
The second argument against taxing international
organizations, or their contractors or staff, is that this
will reduce the amount of money that is available
to be spent on development projects. While often
considered by the development community to be a
self-evident truth, this issue needs to be considered
more closely. It rests on an assumption that a dollar
allocated to an aid project has a better development
or poverty reduction impact than a dollar allocated
to the government. This assumption needs to be
tested empirically. There is considerable literature
on the ineffectiveness of aid spending.16 In a situation
where the government is allocating a large share
of its funds to pro-poor development activities,
such as teacher salaries or basic medicines, it is not
immediately obvious that removing exemptions
from international organizations will lead to less
effective spending on development projects.
A related assumption is that the government is
inefficient or corrupt, or both. However, payment
of taxes helps to solve this problem by motivating
taxpayer pressure for improved government
performance, and this pressure would be enhanced
if the international community also paid taxes.
Specific proposals

Arguments for the maintenance
of exemptions
The major argument for the maintenance of
exemptions is more ideological than logical: “We
are the international community, here to help
the country, and we don’t pay tax.”15 It is partly
15/ A clear example is the response of the international community when a tax
on rental income was introduced in Afghanistan. Many of the most expensive
houses in Kabul are rented by members of the international community: missions,
their contractors, international NGOs, or international staff.The income that
landowners earn from renting their land or properties out to foreigners is
taxable income.The Finance Ministry tried to introduce a withholding regime to

The four proposals presented below are designed
both to allow for the removal of tax exemptions and
collect this revenue – that is, a system where the tenants withhold the income
tax portion on behalf of the landowners and submit that money to the Revenue
Authority – in the same way that employers withhold employees’ income tax
in many countries. In most cases the international community simply refused
to support this approach.They claimed that asking them to withhold the tax
payments in this way represented a tax on them and in this way violated the
Convention on Privileges and Immunity.Yet legally the tax is clearly levied on the
income of the landowner, not on the rent paid by the tenant.
16/ See, for example, R. Rajan and A. Subramanian,“Aid and Growth: What does the
cross-country evidence really show us?” IMF Working Paper WP05/127, June 2005;
and W. Easterly,The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, (Penguin Press, 2006).
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to meet the concerns of the international community
outlined above.

Proposal 2: Explicitly reconsider how
the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations is
interpreted and clearly delimit the
extent of tax exemptions under
the convention.
There is need for a systematic reinterpretation of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities regarding
the extent of exemptions for United Nations missions
and, by extension, bilateral missions, international
agencies, and mission affiliates (international and local
contractors) from local taxes, fees, and user charges.
The convention was crafted 60 years ago in a very
different environment from that in which the United
Nations now operates. Today there are many more
peacekeeping missions (only a quarter of all missions
commenced in the first 40 years of the UN), and
peacekeeping missions have become more complex,
involving a broader array of activities. At the very
least, there needs to be a consistent position taken
across all missions, but the re-interpretation should
also be mindful of the expanded role that agencies
of the international community play in the security,
political development, and economic development of
the territories where they operate.
Presently the same debates are rehashed every time
a post-conflict reconstruction mission is established.
The UN legal office had the same arguments with the
Revenue Authority in Kosovo as it had with the East
Timor Revenue Service. It had the same arguments
with the Ministry of Finance in Afghanistan. This
repetition is wasteful in both time and resources.
What is needed instead is a broader dialogue, possibly
through the new Peacebuilding Commission of the
UN, with involvement from the IMF and World Bank.
This discussion needs to be held outside the cut and
thrust of an individual post-conflict context. In this
discussion, analysis of the broader consequences of
the inconsistent and opportunistic application of the
convention can be undertaken. Then the convention
could be applied consistently in each new postconflict environment.
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Proposal 3: Remove exemptions on
personal income tax for foreign
contractors and their foreign
employees when double taxation
agreements or similar provisions are
in place. Where there are no such
agreements, work to introduce them.
A significant area of confusion involves the tax
liabilities of foreign contractors and their foreign staff
when there are double-taxation agreements or similar
provisions in place. Consider the following example
of a contractor who earns $100,000 for work in a
post-conflict country.17 Let the income tax rate in their
home country be 30 percent, and the tax rate in the
post-conflict country be 20 percent18. The tax liability
with and without the exemption is presented below:
Total tax liability for foreign contractors
and their employees
With
exemption

Without
exemption

100,000

100,000

0

20,000

30,000

30,000

0

20,000

1.

Income

2.

Tax paid in
post-conflict
country (at 20%)

3.

Tax liability in
home country
(at 30%)

4.

Tax credit for
foreign tax paid

5.

Actual tax
paid in home
country (=3-4)

30,000

10,000

6.

Total tax paid
(=2+5)

30,000

30,000

Granting a tax exemption in these situations simply
reduces the tax paid in the post-conflict country while
increasing the tax paid in the home country. When
foreign contractors and their foreign employees are
17/ This example applies equally to a contractor seeking a business-income
or profit tax exemption and to the employee seeking a personal-income tax
exemption.
18/ The marginal income tax rates in post-conflict countries have regularly been
set well below the marginal income tax rates that apply in OECD countries.
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following the laws of both their home jurisdiction
and the post-conflict jurisdiction, then on financial
grounds they should be indifferent to whether
they receive a tax exemption or not. Moreover, the
cost of the aid project will be unchanged, because
the net return to the law-abiding contractor or
employee will be unchanged by the removal of the
tax exemptions.
In the absence of double-taxation agreements,
revenue authorities in donor jurisdictions may not
recognize taxes paid to revenue authorities in postconflict countries as legitimate taxation payments.
In this case, removing the tax exemption will indeed
increase the costs of doing business. However,
following on from Proposal 2, supporting domestic
revenue mobilization involves putting processes in
place to ensure that the revenue authorities in the
donor countries do recognize these payments as
legitimate taxation payments. Officials from the
finance ministries and treasuries of donor countries
regularly engage with the advisers and officials from
the post-conflict ministries of finance and revenue
authorities. A valuable form of assistance would be
if these officials from the donor countries worked
with their colleagues at home to ensure that
credit was given for tax paid in the post-conflict
jurisdiction. In this way, the tax exemptions could
be removed with less complaint.

Proposal 4: Where DONOR countries
provide budget support, remove
their contractors’ tax exemptions
and reduce direct budget support
commensurate with the taxes paid.
One of the ironies in post-conflict assistance is that
donor countries stridently argue for tax exemptions
for their contractors, claiming that development
money shouldn’t just go straight into the post-conflict
country’s treasury, yet at the same time they make
contributions to a multilateral trust fund that makes
payments into the post-conflict country’s treasury.
The primary rationale cannot be fiscal as the funds
are spent regardless. Rather it is likely to be because
the donor country wants to be able to demonstrate its
generosity by publicly (and loudly) announcing every

penny it provides in budget support. However, if the
goal is genuinely to build a stable and sustainable state,
then those donor countries that do provide budget
support can simply alter the way in which they
provide their assistance to help support the creation
of sustainable revenue institutions, without altering
the overall direction or magnitude of their aid flows.
Consider the example of a donor country that has
$100 million in a variety of projects and provides $30
million in budget support, into a trust fund. Rather
than seek a tax exemption for their contractors,
the donor could gross up the project to cover tax
payments and reduce the amount of budget support
by a corresponding amount.This is illustrated below.
Total assistance to recipient government
Treasury with and without exemptions
With
exemption

Without
exemption

100

100

1.

Projects executed
by contractors

2.

Tax liability

0

10

3.

Budget support

30

20

4.

Total contribution
to recipient
treasury (=2+3)

30

30

5.

Total amount
of assistance

130

130

This could be operationalized quite simply. The
donor agency would simply treat the payment of
taxes by its contractors and their employees as an
additional acquittable expense, in much the same
way that travel or per diems are currently treated.
When making claims for payment, contractors would
include evidence of tax paid as part of their expense
claims.19 In reporting their assistance to the OECD
Development Assistance Committee, donors would
break out tax paid for each project, report the net
19/ If the proposals outlined above are implemented, care will need to be
taken to ensure that firms cannot effectively “double dip” – by having their tax
payments to the post-conflict revenue authority recognized as an acquittable
expense and reimbursed, and then seeking credit for tax paid from the revenue
authority in their home jurisdiction.This is an issue that could be addressed in
the broad-ranging discussions envisaged under Proposal 2.
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figure against the relevant sector, and then report all
the tax paid by their contractors against the budget
support category.
Again it should be stressed that this approach does
not alter in any way the amount of assistance allocated
to “development” projects – the main objection of
those who argue for tax exemptions. Nor does it alter
the total amount of assistance provided, including
budget support. Rather it alters the way that assistance
is provided, to leverage additional benefits in building
the institutions of state that will be needed for stable
and sustainable governance.
3. Land taxation
The third proposal for revenue mobilization involves
directly taxing an economic factor of production
(land), rather than taxing economic activity or the
use of that factor. This approach takes advantage of
what is generally regarded as a liability, not an asset
– the uncertainty around land tenure in post-conflict
environments.
Post-conflict environments are characterized by
reduced economic activity. Conflict means that
current demand for goods and services is less certain,
the infrastructure linking producers to market is
uncertain, and the likelihood of being in a position to
collect the returns tomorrow on investments made
today is reduced.
A second characteristic of post-conflict environments
is the depletion of many factors of production.
Factors that are mobile are often moved out in
order to generate economic returns elsewhere. The
physical capital stock in a country in many cases has
been degraded or destroyed by the conflict, while
the financial capital has been invested in foreign
markets to earn safer returns. Skilled labor often has
emigrated in order to earn safer returns, and because
skilled laborers are both more likely to be persecuted
in conflicts and are more likely to be welcomed by
third countries. The stock of land on the other hand,
is immobile. So one option to mobilize revenue in the
short to medium term is to tax the ownership of land.
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Proposal 5: Introduce a tax on
land holding in urban areas.
Land taxation is an option that is rarely considered
in the post-conflict environment, often because the
tenure of the land is in dispute. Yet the disputed
tenure actually represents a key asset in introducing a
land taxation system. It is often difficult to introduce
land taxation in established political systems because
landowners are generally a wealthy and powerful
interest group who are well-placed to protect their
interests. When land tenure is disputed, the power
of this interest group becomes more fractured and
the opportunity to introduce the tax is heightened.
People making claims on disputed land would do so
understanding that a successful claim brings with it
a tax liability.
Land taxation is an excellent way to raise revenue: it
is relatively simple to administer, and relatively hard
to evade. The tax could either be based on the value
of the block of land, or more simply on the size of the
block. A land tax based on the size of the block would
be very simple, transparent, and hard to evade – nonpayment could simply result in seizure of the land.
The focus of any land taxation initiative should be on
urban land rather than on all lands for two reasons.
First, focus on the urban areas will be driven by scarce
administrative capacity. Revenue offices already exist
in major urban areas and the cadastral records will
identify land parcels more easily – even if ownership
is disputed. Second, much of the rural land is used for
subsistence agriculture. For reasons of both equity
and potential revenue yield, the focus should be on
urban land.
Conclusion: Time for an
international undertaking
In a post-conflict environment, the domestic
authorities face a twin challenge. They must try to
mobilize increased domestic revenue and at the same
time build a system that will allow the mobilization
of adequate revenue on a sustainable basis into
the future. There is pressure by the international
community to increase revenue mobilization in
the short term. Yet this same international system
engages in practices that exempt large portions
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of economic activity from taxation, weaken the
capacity of the nascent revenue administration to
effectively do its job, and create incentives for the
state to rely on external budget support rather than
raise revenue domestically.
The proposals outlined in this paper are designed
to improve the practices of the international
community and more effectively support the
mobilization of domestic revenue. This can be
done in three complementary ways: by providing
matching funds for budget support purposes,
strengthening instead of weakening the incentive
for domestic revenue mobilization; by reconsidering
the tax treatment of the international community, so
as to better tap the revenue potential in economic
activity it generates while meeting the concerns of
the international community; and by introducing
taxation on urban lands.
Possibly the most critical proposal is to convene a
meeting of interested participants to consider the
taxation treatment of the international community
in the broader development context. This could
be organized under the auspices of the OECD’s

Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the new
UN Peacebuilding Commission, or the IMF. A blanket
approach to exemptions may have been appropriate
in the environment in which international missions
operated 60 years ago – but their application needs
to be re-interpreted. In a calm environment, outside
the hurly-burly of an individual post-conflict country,
the detrimental impacts of tax exemptions can be
considered and informed choices made to reach
a consistent interpretation of these issues. If the
international community collectively decides to
continue to support large exemptions, then it would
do so mindful of the negative consequences for
domestic resource mobilization and statebuilding.
In the course of these discussions, other proposals
presented in this paper, including the topics of
double-taxation agreements and recasting the
way that budget support is administered, can be
considered together. A package of options could
then be put together that would strengthen the
capacity of the revenue authority to do its job in
raising the resources necessary to meet the most
urgent spending needs of the society.
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APPENDIX 1
Tax exemptions and liability of different organizations, their contractors and their employees:
The example of Kosovo
Organizations
Profit tax

VAT on
imports

Contractors of organizations

Personal income tax on
employees:
foreign

Profit tax

VAT on
imports

VAT paid
internally

local

Personal income tax on
contractor’s employees:
foreign

local

UNMIK, OSCE, UN agencies

N/A

Excluded

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

Taxable

Rebatable

Liable

Exempt

Taxable

KFOR

N/A

Excluded

Exempt

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Rebatable

Liable

Exempt

Taxable

World Bank / IMF

N/A

Excluded

Exempt

Exempt

Taxable

Taxable

Rebatable

Liable

Exempt

Taxable

Euro. Agency for Reconstruction N/A

Excluded

Exempt

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Rebatable

Liable

Exempt

Taxable

USAID

N/A

Excluded

Exempt

Taxable

Exempt

Taxable

Rebatable

Liable

Exempt

Taxable

Country agreements

N/A

Excluded

Exempt

Taxable

Exempt

Exempt

Rebatable

Excluded

Exempt

Taxable

Liaison offices (including EC)

N/A

Excluded

Exempt

Taxable

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Taxable

NGOs

Partly

Rebatable

Exempt

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Liable

Liable

Taxable

Taxable

Provisional Government

N/A

Partly

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Liable

Liable

Taxable

Taxable

Central Bank

Exempt

Liable

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Liable

Liable

Taxable

Taxable

State-owned enterprises

Exempt

Partly

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Liable

Liable

Taxable

Taxable

Private organizations

Taxable

Liable

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Liable

Liable

Taxable

Taxable

Source: Kosovo Revenue Authority.This is a simplified version of the actual table used by the KRA.The full table contains an additional five categories: presumptive tax on organizations, foreign firms, and local firms;
VAT on internal supplies by organizations and VAT on supplies made by contractors of organizations to organizations.

